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In Search of the Mot Juste: Characterizations 
 
of the Revolution of 1688-1689 
 
Lionel K.J. Glassey 
 
The Revolution of 1688-9 has always had a tendency to attract adjectives. The most 
familiar is ‘glorious’, but others which have enjoyed some vogue at different times 
include ‘bloodless’, ‘conservative’, ‘reluctant’, ‘sensible’, ‘aristocratic’, ‘respectable’, 
‘bourgeois’, ‘whig’ and ‘moral’. Most of these words have something to offer as 
thumbnail definitions of the character of the Revolution. Some have been utilized in a 
single phrase in the title of a modern book.1 Others, most notably ‘whig’, are 
shorthand expressions for the theories of an author (in this instance, Macaulay) who 
has advanced a distinctive point of view. The following discussion of these epithets is 
not intended as a detailed historiographical classification of the views of modern 
scholars under the appropriate headings. Rather, it is meant to be a summary of the 
main arguments for and against each appellation. It is, perhaps, inevitable that we 
should start with ‘glorious’. 
I 
The term ‘the Glorious Revolution of 1688’ has become formulaic. The adjective has 
lost its resonances of resplendent heroism, triumph and virtue, and the phrase as a 
whole, by an accident of language and usage, has come to represent simply the events 
of 1688-9 in the British Isles, as distinct from other well-known episodes such as the 
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‘French’, ‘Russian’ or ‘Industrial’ revolutions. However, in the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the concepts embodied in the word ‘glorious’ were not 
meaningless. The phrase seems to have emerged within twelve months of the 
Revolution itself, perhaps when John Hampden, M.P. for Wendover in the 
Convention, said in November 1689 that he thought that those who planned the Rye 
House plot in 1683 had laid the foundations of ‘the glorious revolution’.2 This was 
reported with some distaste, or irony, in tory circles.3  
Those who used the word ‘glorious’ in the short-term aftermath of the 
Revolution seem, as much as anything, to have been expressing relief at the speed and 
clarity of the replacement of ‘popery and arbitrary government’ by ‘protestantism and 
liberty’. Back in the summer of 1688, when the seven bishops were in the Tower of 
London and government (both at the centre and in the localities) was in the hands of 
Catholics, dissenters and shady adventurers, the future had looked bleak to that 
majority of King James’s subjects in England and Scotland which valued stability, 
tranquillity and the protestant religion. By the late autumn of 1688, a renewed civil 
war, with the two sides headed by James and by his son-in-law William, Prince of 
Orange, appeared imminent. But, by the spring of 1689, James had gone and his 
regime had been dismantled. Continuity (represented by James’s elder daughter, the 
new Queen Mary) had been preserved after a fashion. The Declaration of Rights in 
England and the Claim of Right in Scotland seemed to guarantee the rule of law for 
the future. 
This new dawn was not without its anxieties and imperfections, of course. 
Ireland had, indeed, descended into civil war. In Scotland, insecurity persisted as long 
as the Catholic duke of Gordon occupied Edinburgh Castle and Viscount Dundee 
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sustained a Jacobite presence in the Highlands. But there still seemed to be something 
almost miraculous, even ‘providential’, about the manner in which the maelstrom of 
events, from the time of the arrival of the Prince of Orange in November 1688 to his 
elevation (with Mary) to the thrones of England and Scotland in February and May 
1689 respectively, had calmed itself into a more or less tranquil current. The word 
‘glorious’, in short, meant something like ‘unexpectedly satisfactory and complete’.  
 There were other connotations as well, which cemented themselves into a 
construction of a national ‘identity’ as the ‘glorious’ events of 1688-9 receded into the 
past. These connotations included: the courage of those who had organized a 
technically treasonable invitation to the Prince of Orange in June 1688, and then 
prepared for his arrival; the determination and audacity of the Prince of Orange 
himself, in mounting a very difficult exercise in combined naval and military 
operations in November 1688 at a dangerous time of the year; and the resolution of 
the protestants of England, Scotland and Ireland in defending their admittedly 
different perceptions of their religion. From the standpoint of the late eighteenth 
century, when the events of the Revolution of 1688 had passed out of living memory, 
its ‘glory’ had come to be associated with those elements of the British polity which 
the heroes of 1688 had either preserved or initiated, and which were perceived as 
desirable: the ‘mixed’ and ‘balanced’ constitution; annual meetings of parliament; the 
independence of the law-courts; the Union of England and Scotland; the emergence of 
Britain as a formidable ‘great power’, underpinned by the largest navy in Europe, in 
international relations; the freedom of the press; enough, but not too much, religious 
toleration.4
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 It is not difficult to challenge the concept of ‘the Glorious Revolution’, and the 
use of the phrase has long since ceased to denote unequivocal celebration of the 
consequences of the events of 1688-9. One does not have to be a latter-day Jacobite to 
recognize that King James had good reason to be aggrieved at the behaviour of some 
of those who had sworn allegiance to him. The Revolution was founded in some 
distinctly ‘inglorious’ episodes.5 Those who plotted on behalf of the Prince of Orange 
engaged in deceit and treason.  
The conduct of the bishop of London, Henry Compton, supplies a specific 
illustration of this. Compton was one of the seven persons whose names had been 
attached to the letter of 30 June 1688 suggesting that the Prince of Orange should 
come to England.6 The prince’s printed manifesto, his Declaration, subsequently 
distributed in London and the provinces in October 1688, incautiously stated that, in 
deciding to enter the British Isles with an army, he was responding to the solicitation 
of ‘a great many lords, both spiritual and temporal’.7 The king acquired a copy of this 
Declaration. There was a sufficiently small number of archbishops and bishops – the 
‘lords spiritual’ – for the king to be able to interrogate several of them individually as 
to whether they had invited the prince to invade the country. Compton was summoned 
to a private interview with the king on 1 November 1688, and to another meeting on 
the following day with the king, the archbishop of Canterbury and some other bishops 
who were in London. On the first occasion Compton said that he was confident that 
his fellow-bishops would as readily deny inviting the Prince of Orange as himself; on 
the second, when the other spiritual peers made their own denials, he said that he had 
given his answer the previous day.8 Compton was in an impossible situation. Maybe 
his primary loyalty was to William, who was on these days, 1-2 November, actually at 
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sea on the way to Torbay. Whatever his justification, he had misrepresented his own 
conduct when face to face with the king.  
 Deception and treachery tarnished the ‘glory’ of the Revolution in many 
different ways. The desertion to the foreign invader of serving officers in the army 
and the navy in the weeks preceding and following the prince’s arrival on 5 
November was a breach of their oaths of allegiance and of the traditions of their 
service. Captain Ashby of HMS Defiance asserted that ‘in their profession they were 
not taught to turn against the king’, but he changed his mind after reflecting upon ‘the 
necessity there was to free themselves from popish oppression’. Captain Cornewall of 
HMS Constant Warwick ‘expressed the obligations of himself and family to the king, 
and thought it a villany in those who attempted anything against him’, but then ‘gave 
up his zeal for the king’ on learning that several of his friends had joined themselves 
to the prince, and ‘continued heartily attached to the Revolution principles to the day 
of his death’.9 The dismay of the earl of Clarendon on learning that his son, Viscount 
Cornbury, who was serving in a cavalry regiment, had defected on 15 November 
makes his diary distressing reading: ‘O God, that my son should be a rebel! The Lord 
in his mercy look upon me, and enable me to support myself under this most grievous 
calamity.’10 But two weeks later, on 1 December, Clarendon set out from London to 
join the prince himself. The news that the king had agreed to negotiations and to the 
meeting of a parliament had reassured him. Moreover, William’s late mother-in-law, 
the king’s first wife Anne Hyde, had been Clarendon’s own elder sister. Clarendon 
presumably thought that his nephew by marriage, passing close by his Berkshire 
home at Swallowfield, might require to be entertained.  
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A sort of collective national apostasy followed early in 1689. A high 
proportion – not quite all – of office-holders (at every level, down to parish 
constables), of elected members of such bodies as corporations, guilds and livery 
companies, of clergymen, and of private individuals abandoned the oaths of 
allegiance they had earlier taken to King James and took new oaths to King William 
and Queen Mary. Even the stoutest defender of ‘Revolution principles’ might have 
admitted that the word ‘glorious’ was inappropriate to describe this sacrifice of earlier 
oaths to a monarch who was still alive.  
 Another feature of the Revolution that anyone who might seek to characterize 
it as ‘glorious’ would be unwise to stress is its dependence for its credibility on the 
rumours surrounding the birth of the Prince of Wales on 10 June 1688. There were 
several such rumours: Queen Mary of Modena was never pregnant at all, and the 
‘birth’ of the prince was an elaborate, long-planned deception; the queen had been 
pregnant, but suffered a miscarriage in the spring of 1688; the queen had been 
pregnant, but a still-born baby was replaced at short notice on 10 June by a substitute 
smuggled into the palace of St James, allegedly in a warming-pan; the queen had been 
pregnant, and an infant Prince of Wales had been born on 10 June, but subsequently 
had fallen ill and died at Richmond in the late summer or early autumn of 1688, and 
was again replaced by a substitute. All of these possibilities are indiscriminately 
described, without much apparent awareness of their contradictions, by Gilbert Burnet 
when revising earlier versions of his History of My Own Time in the middle of Queen 
Anne’s reign nearly twenty years after the event.11 Burnet’s account of the birth of the 
baby who was to become the ‘Old Pretender’ was, for an intelligent and generally 
informed author, uncritical. ‘It is lamentable,’ wrote his nineteenth-century editor, 
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‘that such a man as Burnet should have disgraced himself by the recital of these stupid 
and inconsistent falsehoods.’12  
The rumours, individually and collectively, amount to an accusation that the 
king, the queen and (presumably) some courtiers and domestic servants had diverted 
the succession to the crowns of England, Scotland and Ireland in order to ensure a 
continuous line of Catholic kings into the distant future. If the rumours were true, they 
meant that James was not simply an ill-advised monarch pursuing unpopular policies. 
He was a criminal. He was depriving Mary and Anne, his grown-up protestant 
daughters by his first marriage, of the rightful title to the property they were to inherit 
in sequence as the first and second heirs presumptive. The belief that James was 
committing a fraud on this scale was influential in convincing the credulous that he 
had disqualified himself from continuing to wear the crown. But if the rumours were 
not true, then the Revolution loses one of the principal reasons which high-minded 
contemporaries used as justification for committing themselves to it. Such persons 
would not have backed, at the time or retrospectively, a rebellion against a king who 
was merely misguided. They could, and did, support a rebellion against a king who 
was alleged to have resorted to a disgraceful crime.  
 In the overheated atmosphere of June 1688, even James’s own daughters had 
thought it odd that their stepmother had not done more to quell suspicions about her 
pregnancy, and wondered if there might not after all be some truth in the coffee-house 
speculations which so many seemed to believe. ‘I shall never now be satisfied 
whether the child be true or false,’ wrote Anne to Mary, ‘it may be it is our brother, 
but God only knows, for she [the queen] never took care to satisfy the world …’. 
After some sentences of gynaecological detail, Anne concluded ‘… after all this, ’tis 
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possible it may be her child, but where one believes it, a thousand do not. For my part, 
except they [the king and queen] do give very plain demonstrations, which is almost 
impossible now, I shall ever be of the number of unbelievers.’13 The king and queen 
did their best to provide ‘plain demonstrations’; they submitted themselves to the 
humiliation of summoning a succession of witnesses to the birth, including midwives 
and washerwomen who testified among other things to the condition of the queen’s 
underclothes during her pregnancy, before the privy council in October 1688.14  
 Many generations have passed since any historian has taken the rumours about 
the birth of the Prince of Wales at all seriously. But the intrinsic truth of rumours, and 
the influence which rumours (whatever their degree of truth or falsity) may have on 
contemporary opinion, are two different things. The suspicions about the birth of the 
Prince of Wales do seem to have contributed materially to the propaganda of the 
Revolution, and to its acceptability, well into the eighteenth century.15 A revolution 
resting on such foundations might reasonably be regarded as something less than 
‘glorious’. 
Moreover, the long-term developments which followed the Revolution 
sometimes fell short of the criteria normally applied when contemplating the concept 
of ‘glory’. Religious liberty was restricted, inasmuch as the English Toleration Act of 
1689 gave freedom of conscience and worship to protestant dissenters, but barred 
them from office under the crown, from elected office in municipal corporations, and 
from the English universities; furthermore, Catholics were explicitly excluded from 
the Act, and continued to be subject to persecution. Patronage and privilege remained 
features of elections to the house of Commons and of governmental politics 
throughout the eighteenth century. Britain’s commitments abroad in defence of the 
 9
Revolution entailed high taxation in wartime and the creation of a large national debt, 
and were to be a drain on Britain’s economy as long as hostile nations backed the 
Jacobites. Those contemporaries who foresaw that the offer of the crown to William 
and Mary would entail permanent quarrels upon the nation were not wrong.16 In the 
early twenty-first century, the clause in the Act of Settlement of 1701 which compels 
Catholics to drop out of the hereditary line of succession to the throne, the 
permanence of the Anglo-Scottish Union, and the political arrangements of Northern 
Ireland all remain controversial, in ways linked (directly or indirectly) to the 
Revolution of 1688-9. The perception of that Revolution as ‘glorious’ may seem 
difficult to sustain. 
II 
The phrase ‘the Glorious Revolution’ has become neutral and descriptive, but any 
discussion of whether the Revolution really was ‘glorious’ (or not) is bound to be 
somewhat subjective. Also implying value judgments of one kind or another, albeit 
less committed ones, are those interpretive concepts which still carry with them some 
pale reflexion of the idea that the Revolution of 1688-9 was, if not ‘glorious’, at least 
vaguely commendable.  
One such is ‘the bloodless Revolution’, sometimes employed to suggest that 
the Revolution of 1688 was conducted with less violence than usually seems to have 
been the case when nations such as France in 1789 or Russia in 1917 embark on 
sudden political change. There was, in the autumn of 1688, much concern, frequently 
expressed in private letters, in addresses, and in sermons, about the prospect of ‘the 
effusion of blood’. The danger that the nation was to be plunged once again into a 
civil war like that of the 1640s was an overwhelming preoccupation.17 In England, 
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there was correspondingly great relief as the danger of civil war receded. The 
casualties of the Revolution in England appear to have been approximately fifty 
soldiers killed and wounded in minor skirmishes at Cirencester, Wincanton and 
Reading in November and December 1688, plus, no doubt, a small number of persons 
injured in the rioting in London and elsewhere in the aftermath of the king’s flight on 
11 December. It is true that few revolutions are as bloodless as this one in England; 
but the concept of a ‘bloodless’ Revolution of 1688 seems less convincing when 
Scotland and Ireland are considered. The campaigns in Scotland in 1689-90 shed a 
good deal of blood. The war fought from 1689 to 1691 in Ireland was precisely the 
renewal of a civil war, with professional armies conducting authentic sieges and 
battles, that had been so much dreaded in England in 1688. The combined total of 
casualties in Scotland and Ireland in the three years after the Revolution probably 
exceeded 15000. 
 Another off-shoot of the theme of the Revolution as a worthy enterprise, if not 
exactly ‘glorious’, is the notion of a ‘protective’ revolution; that is, a revolution 
undertaken to defend the cherished ideals and liberties of the nation against ill-advised 
and doctrinaire reform imposed from above, or against a revival of discredited 
principles such as religious fanaticism and military rule from the 1650s, or against 
evils such as ‘arbitrary government’ imported from Louis XIV’s France. This was the 
view of the Revolution taken by William himself and his closest adherents. It was not 
really a ‘revolution’ at all; or, if it was, then it was a ‘conservative’ revolution. It was 
necessary action undertaken, not to change anything especially, but to ensure that the 
fundamental liberties associated with the law, the protestant religion, and the 
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constitution were safeguarded for future generations. This was not ‘the Glorious 
Revolution’; rather, it was ‘the Desirable Preservation’.  
This ‘protective’ or ‘conservative’ interpretation has something in common 
with the theories of the Revolution as a ‘sensible’ revolution or as a ‘counter-
revolution’, which are discussed below. It differs from them, inasmuch as the events 
of 1688-9 are presented in a more positive, assertive light, as a crusade 
conscientiously undertaken by persons committed to the maintenance of institutions, 
privileges and traditions which they valued as part of the national heritage. A hundred 
years earlier, in 1588, patriots had resisted a foreign invasion – the Spanish Armada – 
to defend this heritage; now, in 1688, their equally patriotic descendants paradoxically 
welcomed a foreign invasion for precisely the same purpose. The contemporary 
estimate was that ‘nineteen-twentieths’ of the population welcomed the Prince of 
Orange’s expedition.18 This statistical guesswork reflected an attempt to assert that the 
prince was rescuing the nation and restoring its laws and liberties, rather than 
invading it, conquering it, or usurping it.  
A perception of a ‘protective’ Revolution was acceptable in England, where 
the Church of England was cherished by a majority in all social classes and where 
James’s ecclesiastical programme had aroused wide alarm; but its appeal was much 
less in Scotland, where the prince’s promise to ‘preserve the protestant religion 
established by law’ did not enthuse those, again of all social classes, who disliked the 
episcopalian church settlement of 1660 ‘established by law’ in Scotland, and who 
wished to exploit the prince’s intervention to replace that settlement with a 
presbyterian church along the lines laid down at the time of the Reformation in 
Scotland in the 1560s.19 In Scotland, therefore, the Revolution was conceived to be a 
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preliminary to change, not a guarantee of continuity; it was less a ‘protective’ 
revolution than a ‘reforming’ revolution. 
III 
The notion of a ‘reluctant’ Revolution of 1688-9, a revolution which was regretted as 
an unavoidable necessity by the majority of James’s comfort-loving subjects who 
required of their government only that it should interfere as little as possible with their 
local communities and with the individual pursuit of prosperity, has been fashionable 
since the publication of William A. Speck’s Reluctant Revolutionaries in 1988.20 This 
interpretation is in many ways persuasive. It is preferable to the idea of a ‘glorious’ 
revolution, inasmuch as it builds into the history of the events of 1688-9 an 
appreciation of widespread attitudes and opinions from the late 1670s onwards. The 
loyalty shown to the duke of York during the period of the Popish plot and the 
exclusion crisis in 1678-81; the enthusiasm for him when he succeeded his brother as 
King James VII and II in February 1685; the comprehensive defeat of the rebellions 
of Argyll and Monmouth in the summer of 1685: all suggest that those who had 
become disenchanted with James by the winter of 1688-9 experienced some difficulty 
in overcoming what had earlier been a powerful commitment to James’s regime.  
It cannot too often be emphasized that those who participated in moderate, 
respectful opposition to James’s policies, and then in the confused events following 
William’s arrival and James’s flight in November and December 1688, were 
constrained by memories of the civil wars and the regicide in the 1640s and of the 
military regimes in the 1650s. How were the maverick initiatives of James and his 
ministers in government and religion to be countered, without risking a renewed 
conflict with unforeseeable consequences? The dangers were so great that many who 
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deprecated the policies of the king and who lamented his apparent willingness to 
undermine the Church of England were unable to translate their apprehensions into 
decisive action. Such attitudes manifested both timidity, and genuine qualms of 
conscience.  
For example, the seven persons who subscribed the letter of 30 June 1688 to 
the prince might have been eight, but the earl of Nottingham dropped out at the last 
minute. ‘You will wonder, I believe, not to see [Nottingham] among the other 
figures,’ Henry Sidney wrote to William in an accompaniment to the invitation 
(which had not been signed, but subscribed with code numbers, or ‘figures’, 
representing the names). ‘He was gone very far, but now his heart fails him, and he 
will go no further; he saith ’tis scruples of conscience, but we all conclude it is 
another passion …’.21 Nottingham did not lack courage, as his career in politics for 
more than thirty years after the Revolution demonstrates; but, as he shamefacedly told 
another conspirator, Edward Russell, he had been advised by his clerical friends that 
he should not actively seek to resist even a design to destroy religious and civil rights 
and liberties, since such resistance could not be justified by the law.22  
Later, in the autumn of 1688, Lord Chesterfield refused to be drawn into 
Danby’s conspiratorial activities in the North of England. Danby informed 
Chesterfield, in September or early October 1688, that the Prince of Orange was 
preparing to land with 12000 men, and that the greater part of the army and many of 
the nobility would join with him. Chesterfield replied that he did not wish to rebel 
against the king, especially as he was still a privy councillor. Although he thought an 
insurrection would succeed, he was sure that he would always be remorseful if he 
participated in it.23  
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Similar opinions – a compound of prudence, duty, and the memory of the 
1640s – may have influenced those who were prominent in the counties and towns in 
which they resided. Many gentlemen, invited in October 1688 to resume the offices in 
the militia and on the magistrates’ bench from which they had been dismissed earlier 
in James’s reign for their reluctance to comply with indiscriminate toleration, 
expressed their loyalty to the king even as they politely but firmly rejected his offer to 
restore them to their commissions. Some former justices of the peace in Norfolk 
articulated this attitude lucidly: 
When it was His Majesty’s pleasure to honour us with his Commission we 
served him with loyalty and fidelity and as we were obliged by the Church of 
England and our allegiance. And we are steadily resolved to continue in all 
dutiful obedience to His Majesty and will be most willing and ready to serve 
His Majesty in all things which may consort with His Majesty’s honour and 
our safety, which we cannot do by our acting in conjunction with Persons 
unqualified and incapacitated by the Laws of this Realm.24
Men such as these probably did not want a revolution. If one occurred through the 
intervention of the Prince of Orange while they stood on the sidelines, they might 
acquiesce in it; provided that, as far as possible, bloodshed and civil war did not 
accompany it. 
 So closely linked to the interpretation of the Revolution as ‘reluctant’ as to be 
almost inseparable from it are the concepts of an ‘unexpected’, ‘unintended’ or 
‘accidental’ Revolution. The downfall of King James, his replacement on the throne, 
the legislation of the Revolution settlement, and the long-term political, constitutional 
and ecclesiastical developments which ensued, were outcomes which few of those 
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involved had even remotely envisaged before James’s decision to flee the country in 
mid-December 1688. What was anticipated, as a best-case scenario, was that James, 
chastened by the evident disapproval of his subjects and by the intervention of his 
son-in-law, and surrounded by responsible counsellors of the traditional kind whom 
he would be compelled to reappoint, would resume the duties of kingship. There 
would be a general election. Some limitation of James’s powers by parliamentary 
statute would probably have followed, especially vis-à-vis the appointment of 
ministers and judges, the size of the army, and the exercise of the suspending power. 
An arrangement relating to the restoration of municipal charters and the privileges of 
colleges at the universities would presumably have been reached. It is likely that some 
such solution was in the minds of James’s protestant subjects during the weeks 
immediately before and after the arrival of the Prince of Orange.25 An accommodation 
along these lines was foreshadowed when representatives from James and William 
met at Hungerford in Berkshire to open negotiations on 8-10 December 1688. What 
prevented all this was James’s flight. The form that the Revolution was eventually to 
take developed out of ad hoc adjustments to the emergency conditions into which the 
nation was unexpectedly plunged on 11 December when it was learned that the king 
had gone. 
 Moreover, several individuals, including the earl of Nottingham, the marquess 
of Halifax and Sir Robert Sawyer, took the view that the acquittal of the seven 
bishops and the prospect of a general election meant that the intervention in English 
politics of the Prince of Orange was not required at all.26 Sawyer thought that ‘nothing 
can more dishearten the Enemyes of our religion then an Unanimous choice of 
members to serve in Parliament’, and his anticipation that the Church of England 
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party would hold firm in the constituencies during the election, and in the house of 
Commons after it, was perfectly reasonable.27 In any case, the house of Lords would 
stand in the way of legislation damaging to the Church of England proposed by a 
packed and subservient house of Commons. Time, moderation and conciliation would 
bring about a solution. The king would be made to understand his own best interests. 
The ‘evil counsellors’ who had misled him would be dismissed. The crisis in politics, 
government and religion would subside, civil war would be avoided, and life would 
return to normal. In short, the Revolution was not only ‘reluctant’, ‘unexpected’, 
‘unintended’ and ‘accidental’; it was also ‘unnecessary’. 
 There is much to be said for these interpretations; but they are open to 
criticism. There was, perhaps, a general assumption that James would remain on the 
throne, and that William’s role would be confined to assisting his father-in-law to 
regain the confidence of his subjects. But a vocal minority thought otherwise. There 
are plenty of examples of individuals who were openly hostile to James, and who 
pressed for a radical, even a revolutionary outcome. William Harbord boasted in 
December 1688 that he conceived himself to be in rebellion against the king. Lord 
Delamer asserted that he no longer looked upon James as king and would no longer 
obey him. Clarendon noted at the conference of peers on 24 December that a group of 
whig lords were ‘bitter and fierce’ against the king. After the Convention met, 
Colonel Birch, the 73-year-old member for Weobley – whose military title derived 
from the New Model Army – opened a debate on the state of the nation on 29 January 
1689, in words reminiscent of a speech by Oliver Cromwell himself: 
When I consider the extraordinary hand of God that brought us hither, and the 
freedom we are here met in, it amazes me; and I am not able to comprehend 
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this work of God in such an extraordinary manner; and, concerning King 
James’s deposing himself, ’tis the hand of God. These forty years we have 
been scrambling for our Religion, and have saved but little of it. We have been 
striving against Anti-Christ, Popery and Tyranny. 
In the house of Lords, on 31 January, Lord Montagu remarked that he felt himself to 
be absolved from all allegiance, and Lord Delamer said that if King James returned he 
would fight him sword in hand. Men such as these were anything but ‘reluctant’ 
revolutionaries.28  
It is not difficult to identify individual examples of ‘willing’, ‘eager’ 
revolutionaries. But were there enough of them, and did they represent a sufficiently 
substantial body of wider public opinion, to challenge the interpretation of the 
Revolution as characteristically ‘reluctant’? This question cannot readily be answered. 
However, a prominent element in the rhetoric of the ‘enthusiastic’ revolutionaries was 
their exploitation of the suspicions about the Prince of Wales. If they could persuade 
the nation that the baby was spurious, then everybody was bound to urge that James’s 
reign be brought to an end without delay. How could he remain on the throne when 
his alleged fraud had so completely lost him the respect of his subjects? It follows 
that, if this belief that there was something dubious about the Prince of Wales was 
widespread, as contemporary propaganda indicates that it probably was, then perhaps 
the Revolution was less ‘reluctant’ than it might have appeared.  
 Another possible weakness in the ‘reluctant’, ‘accidental’ or ‘unnecessary’ 
interpretations of the Revolution is that it is difficult to apply these adjectives to the 
Revolution in Scotland. It is not impossible; Ian B. Cowan made the attempt in two 
essays published in 1989 and 1991.29 Cowan argued that James’s power base in 
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Scotland was the episcopalian Church of Scotland, which was extravagantly loyal; 
that the Scots were not much interested in the trial of the seven bishops in 1688; that 
James’s indulgence was welcomed by the majority of moderate presbyterians as well 
as by the Scottish Catholics, while the more extreme Cameronians were too 
insignificant in numbers to affect the issue; and that it was James’s flight, and the 
subsequent developments in England, which pushed the venal and opportunistic 
Scottish politicians into ‘revolutionary’ activity. ‘It is undeniable,’ Cowan concluded, 
‘that the Scots had at the onset been very reluctant revolutionaries.’30  
This view of the Revolution in Scotland has since been revised. Many Scots 
took an active part in expressing vigorous opposition to James’s Catholic regime in 
Scotland: by contributing to the Orangist conspiracy in the summer and autumn of 
1688, by mobilizing out-of-doors agitation against Catholics in general and against 
James’s Scottish counsellors in particular, and by welcoming a ‘revolutionary’ 
settlement of government and religion in Scotland in the first six months of 1689. The 
Scottish Convention was more forthright than its English counterpart when it 
announced, not that James had ‘abdicated’ the Scottish throne, but that he had 
‘forefaulted’ it. The Scottish ‘Revolution settlement’ had many distinctively radical 
features.31 In the light of this evidence, the proposition that the Scots passively, or 
‘reluctantly’, accepted a Revolution forced upon them (whether by William’s arrival 
in England, or by James’s departure from England, or by the precedents set by the 
English Convention before its Scottish equivalent even met) seems flawed. 
IV 
Somewhere intermediate between the concepts of a ‘glorious’ revolution and a 
‘reluctant’ revolution is a ‘sensible’ revolution. This implies that what happened in 
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1688-9 owed little to doctrinaire principles and even less to the fanatical assertion of 
them. The Revolution was a sequence of moderate compromises arrived at by 
responsible persons in a spirit of pragmatism. The phrase was brought to prominence 
in an illuminating essay by John Morrill published in 1991.32 Morrill took as the 
framework for his analysis a book written by G.M. Trevelyan, Macaulay’s great-
nephew, which was published for the 250th anniversary of the Revolution in 1938.33 
Morrill, with reservations, found something to admire in Trevelyan’s exposition; not 
so much for its weight of scholarship (which was unimpressive), but rather for its 
consistency and elegance. The word ‘sensible’ avoids the triumphalist overtones of 
‘glorious’, but still conveys the view that the Revolution was deserving of 
approbation. It sidesteps the implication in the word ‘reluctant’ that the Revolution 
was somehow unwanted or unintended, by hinting at intelligent, reasonable solutions 
to difficult problems which had been squarely faced. Trevelyan had suggested that the 
‘British’ nation, confronted with a monarch who overestimated his constitutional 
powers and who was headstrong in his pursuit of an unacceptable programme, 
gratefully accepted the opportunities offered by the arrival of the Prince of Orange 
and by James’s folly in dethroning himself by his flight. Sensibly, responsible men 
took upon themselves the task of maintaining order after James’s departure. Sensibly, 
William summoned bodies which looked and behaved exactly like traditional 
Parliaments in England and Scotland. Sensibly, these bodies, the Conventions, 
hammered out constitutional and political settlements which proved acceptable 
enough to minimize violence and civil war in the short term and which, in the medium 
and long term, evolved into a stable, solidly-based polity, the envy of Europe in the 
nineteenth century.  
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Morrill subjected Trevelyan’s interpretation to sustained scrutiny. He 
undermined the teleological quality in Trevelyan’s approach by challenging sharply 
Trevelyan’s assumption that the Revolution inaugurated a harmonious regime of 
parliamentary ‘liberty’, in which consensus politics prevailed and whigs and tories 
agreed to disagree in civilized fashion. More positively, Morrill drew attention to 
Trevelyan’s willingness – like his great-uncle, but unlike some more recent historians 
– to incorporate Scotland, Ireland and the American colonies into his discussion. 
Morrill concluded that, with all the faults of his book, Trevelyan had devised a 
genuinely plausible interpretation of the Revolution.34
 In the course of his critique of Trevelyan, Morrill identified three weaknesses 
in the ‘sensible’ interpretation. First, it is difficult to describe the Revolution as 
‘sensible’ when one of its by-products was the bitter, intractable conflict between 
adherents of the Revolution on the one hand and Jacobites and non-jurors on the 
other. This conflict was to divide the British Isles for the following sixty years or 
more. Second, those admired aspects of the Revolution, ‘moderation’ and 
‘compromise’, might be thought to amount to little more than the distorting, obscuring 
or fudging of principles of importance to well-read persons of integrity and 
sophisticated intelligence in the seventeenth century such as John Milton, Algernon 
Sidney and John Locke: republicanism, liberty and puritanism. These principles were, 
in the 1690s and through the eighteenth century, swept under the carpet. The 
Revolution was not really ‘sensible’; it was, rather, ‘sanitized’.35 Third, there is about 
the phrase, the ‘sensible’ Revolution, some hint of complacency and self-
congratulation, as though ‘the British’, unlike other less enlightened nations, prefer to 
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have gentlemanly good-natured revolutions, when it suits them to have revolutions at 
all. 
V 
A different range of interpretations of the Revolution of 1688-9 are those which seek 
to identify it with the ambitions of a particular social class. Any of the aristocracy, the 
country gentry, the urban bourgeoisie, or the common people might have taken the 
lead in forcing James off the throne and placing William and Mary upon it, 
subsequently profiting from this change by compelling William and his successors to 
govern in their interests. Any of these groups in society, without necessarily coming 
to the fore in the events of 1688-9, might still have benefited from the working out of 
the Revolution settlement and from the consequences which followed, to the point 
where the Revolution might legitimately be considered as ‘their’ revolution. 
 One such interpretation with some evidence to support it is the theory that the 
Revolution was an ‘aristocratic’ revolution, even when ‘the aristocracy’ is defined in 
the limited sense of the members of the house of Lords and their immediate family: 
their wives, sisters, younger brothers, heirs, daughters, younger sons, and 
grandchildren. All of the seven who subscribed the invitation to William were 
‘aristocrats’. The earl of Danby, the earl of Shrewsbury, the earl of Devonshire and 
Lord Lumley were peers anyway. Henry Compton, the bishop of London, was a 
younger son of the earl of Northampton. Henry Sidney was a younger son of the earl 
of Leicester. Edward Russell was a grandson of the earl of Bedford.  
The local risings against James in November 1688 were managed by 
‘aristocrats’: Danby, assisted by Lord Willoughby d’Eresby (the heir to the earldom 
of Lindsey), Lord Haughton (the heir to the earldom of Clare) and Lord Fairfax of 
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Cameron (a Scottish peer), in Yorkshire; Lord Lumley in County Durham; Lord 
Delamer and the earl of Derby in Lancashire and Cheshire; the earls of Devonshire, 
Scarsdale, Manchester and Northampton, plus Lord Grey of Ruthin, in the 
Midlands.36 Others who were active on William’s behalf in the south and west of 
England, or who made early declarations in favour of the laws and liberties of the 
nation under his protection, included Lord Lovelace, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and 
the earl of Bath. Among the army officers who defected from James to William were 
the dukes of Grafton and Ormonde, the earl of Colchester and Lord Churchill. The 
house of Lords in the Convention considered possible solutions to the crisis of 
James’s flight, including two – a regency, and the succession of Mary by herself – 
which found little favour in the elected chamber. The Lords’ input into the 
Declaration of Rights and into the settlement that was eventually arrived at, especially 
the Toleration Act, was considerable.37  
 The peers reaped their reward. Individuals were promoted up the ranks of the 
peerage. Danby became successively marquess of Carmarthen in 1689 and duke of 
Leeds in 1694, and Shrewsbury and Devonshire also became dukes in 1694. Lumley 
rose from a barony to the earldom of Scarborough in 1690. Henry Sidney became 
Viscount Sidney in 1689 and earl of Romney in 1694. Edward Russell became earl of 
Orford in 1697. Lord Willoughby d’Eresby, having succeeded his father as earl of 
Lindsey in 1701, eventually died in 1723 as duke of Ancaster. Lord Haughton 
succeeded his father as earl of Clare in 1689 and was created duke of Newcastle, 
following the extinction of the Cavendish line of dukes of Newcastle, in 1694. Lord 
Delamer became earl of Warrington. Admiral Herbert, who had commanded 
William’s fleet, became earl of Torrington. Churchill became earl, later duke, of 
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Marlborough. Collectively, ‘the aristocracy’ embarked on that domination of politics 
and government in the British Isles which was to last for 150 years through the reigns 
of William, Anne and the first four Georges, until it was diminished (though by no 
means ended) in the 1830s and 1840s with the Reform Act and the repeal of the Corn 
Laws. 
 This ‘aristocratic’ revolution seems to have some evidence behind it, but there 
are qualifications to it as a reading of the events of the winter of 1688-9. A quite large 
number of ‘aristocrats’ were indifferent, or hostile, to William’s pretensions, and 
remained loyal to James. Three examples, all of whom engaged in Jacobite plots in 
the 1690s, were the earls of Ailesbury, Clarendon and Dartmouth. The house of Lords 
in the Convention came close to scuppering the Revolution altogether. It doubted 
whether James had abdicated. It questioned whether the throne was vacant. It spent 
precious time in debating whether a regency, with James remaining on the throne as 
titular monarch, might not be the best solution. Among those who voted for a regency 
on 29 January 1689 were the dukes of Ormonde and Grafton and the earl of Scarsdale, 
who had all deserted James in November 1688.38 Strenuous argument was required to 
bring some peers on to the side of the Revolution. The earl of Thanet, a very 
‘reluctant’ revolutionary, confessed that he ‘thought we had done ill in admitting the 
monarchy to be elective; for so this vote [that William and Mary be declared king and 
queen] had made it; but he thought there was an absolute necessity of having a 
Government; and he did not see it likely to be any other way than this.’39  
It is, moreover, impossible to argue that aristocrats, collectively, believed in 
1688-9 that their long-term interests would be advanced by the substitution of 
William for James. The stranglehold over government exercised by the aristocracy in 
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the eighteenth century was to mean, in practice, that every cabinet would contain a 
majority of peers, that every house of Commons would contain numerous members 
(though never a majority) who had been nominated by aristocratic patrons in the 
constituencies, and that the armed services, the embryonic civil service and the 
Church of England would rely heavily in their appointments and promotions on 
aristocratic recommendation. But the Revolution of 1688-9 did not initiate these 
organic developments, which date back at least to the Restoration of 1660. During his 
time in office as lord treasurer in the 1670s, Danby was already beginning to exploit 
the political influence of his aristocratic relations and friends with a view to 
supplementing a consistent majority for the ‘court party’ in the house of Commons 
through the management of patronage. Also, most of Charles II’s ministers were peers 
on their appointment, or lost no time in soliciting a peerage in reward for their 
services.40 The Revolution does not seem to have contributed much to ‘aristocratic’ 
power, apart perhaps from slightly accelerating its development.  
 There is more mileage in the theory of an ‘aristocratic’ revolution if the word 
‘aristocracy’ is reinterpreted to mean ‘the élite’. A looser definition of ‘aristocracy’ 
incorporates all persons enjoying privilege, in the form of the ownership either of 
land, or of commercial or industrial wealth. The Revolution comes into focus as the 
revolution of the propertied, ‘respectable’ classes: country gentlemen, merchants, 
tradesmen, lawyers, government officials, university tutors and local officeholders, as 
well as noblemen.  
In particular, those who had come into possession of estates confiscated from 
the church at the time of the Reformation had something to fear from a Catholic king 
who might be tempted to recover them.41 James explicitly denied that he would do so 
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in his Declaration of Indulgence, the last paragraph of which runs: ‘… we have 
thought fit further to declare that we will maintain [our loving subjects] in all their 
properties and possessions, as well of church and abbey lands as in any other lands 
and properties whatsoever.’42 But landowners, looking ahead, could not be sure that 
the king would be able to resist the pressure from the pope and the Catholic clergy for 
the restoration of the church’s heritage. In the event, James never did seek to recover 
monastic or chantry lands. He did, however, interfere with the possessions of his 
subjects in a different way. Within eight months of the appearance of the Declaration 
in April 1687, the fellows of Magdalen College in Oxford, who held their fellowships 
as a freehold, were being ejected from these fellowships for disobedience to the king’s 
command to elect his nominee as their President.43  
James only directly threatened the ownership of property by his subjects in the 
case of Magdalen College. He may also have done so indirectly, when the court of 
king’s bench imposed an enormous and disproportionate fine of £30,000 on the earl of 
Devonshire for a minor brawl within the verge of the royal palace. This last episode 
contributed to those clauses in the Declaration of Rights condemning the exaction of 
excessive bail and the imposition of excessive punishments.44 There is another 
possibility that James’s ‘respectable’ subjects, albeit of humbler status, might have 
lost financially as a result of his programme of religious toleration. An attempt was 
made in July and August 1688 to calculate the sums paid in fines by recusants and 
dissenters between 1677 and 1688. If the aim of this exercise was to reimburse those 
who had suffered for reasons of their religion, then possibly the wealthier inhabitants 
of those parishes which had levied fines or distrained goods might have been obliged 
to contribute to repayments.45  
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 James did antagonize the ‘respectable’ classes in a different sense. He 
dismissed them in droves from the offices they held by virtue of their social status, 
which in turn was derived from their ownership of property. Those affected included, 
principally: the noblemen who were lords-lieutenant and custodes rotulorum in the 
counties; the country gentlemen who were deputy-lieutenants in the militia and 
justices of the peace; and the merchants, tradesmen and lawyers who were mayors, 
aldermen, common councilmen, bailiffs and recorders in the towns and cities, 
following the issue of new charters for the corporations which paved the way for 
municipal regulation to take place. 
 The extent of the changes in the names of officeholders in the English and 
Welsh counties and towns played a substantial part in conditioning the character of 
the Revolution. Beginning in the winter of 1686-7, the regulation of county justices of 
the peace intensified in 1688 to the point where by the late summer of that year most 
counties had experienced extensive change, involving the dismissal of 75 per cent or 
more of their magistrates. This purge of the bench on such a huge, and unprecedented, 
scale aroused resentment among the country gentlemen who conceived themselves to 
be the natural rulers of their local communities. Not only were they dismayed by their 
own omission; they resented the appearance of Catholic gentlemen to serve in their 
places, or, in those counties where Catholic gentry families were thin on the ground, 
by the appearance as JPs of ex-puritans, ex-Cromwellians, and obscure opportunists.46 
Similar dismissals of officeholders took place with regard to the militia, and also in 
the towns, and these resulted in similar disenchantment with James’s regime.47 
Bungled and incomplete attempts to restore the commissions of the peace and the 
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corporations in October 1688 were, only too plainly, panic measures in response to 
the news that the Prince of Orange was preparing his invasion.  
These changes among officeholders did not cause the Revolution, exactly. The 
Revolution cannot be described as a rebellion of angry country gentlemen and 
townsmen, who were demanding to be reinstated in positions conferring power in the 
counties and corporations. What the changes did do, was to create an atmosphere in 
which these traditional ruling groups in the localities were unwilling to make much of 
an effort to defend the king to whom they had sworn allegiance when misfortune fell 
upon him. He had rejected their service. He had put his trust in persons disqualified 
by the law from holding offices formerly held by loyal and legally qualified men. 
Disillusioned ex-officeholders, who were also property-owners, were prepared to let 
him take the consequences of his behaviour; this was the line taken by the gentlemen 
of Norfolk who are quoted above. There were, of course, many individual exceptions. 
Sir John Reresby in Yorkshire represents in his Memoirs the attitudes of a gentleman 
who retained his loyalty to the king, while at the same time registering disapproval of 
the upheavals in the personnel of the bench of magistrates in the West Riding, and 
also in Middlesex, on both of which he sat.48 But the Revolution was facilitated in the 
provinces of England and Wales by the sullen acquiescence in it of disconsolate and 
disgruntled men of property who had formerly been officeholders.  
 One important piece of evidence adds an extra dimension to this conclusion. 
This is Roger Morrice’s ‘Ent’ring Book’.49 Morrice, a well-informed dissenting 
clergyman resident in London, described the processes by which the county justices 
of the peace were reshuffled by the privy council in 1686-7 in a manner that indicates 
that, if he was not present himself, he was in close touch with someone (perhaps one 
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of the clerks to the council) who was. He recorded such details as where individual 
councillors stood, and which of them had a copy of a liber pacis, a chancery list of the 
justices’ names. Morrice confirmed that Lord Chancellor Jeffreys, technically 
responsible for appointing and dismissing justices of the peace, played little part; and 
also that the king himself made the final decisions as to who was to be added and who 
left out. The principal advisers of the king in this regulation were three Catholic peers: 
the earl of Powis, Lord Arundel of Wardour, and Lord Dover. The bishop of Durham 
and (unexpectedly) the lord deputy of Ireland, Lord Tyrconnell, provided some help.50 
Morrice further gives information about more changes among the justices of the peace 
conducted, not by the council, but by a committee of regulators in 1688.  
What is surprising about Morrice’s account is that he wholeheartedly 
welcomed the changes. It is easy to assume that the remodelling of the county 
commissions of the peace was everywhere resented as a breach in what had, since 
1660, come to be regarded as the natural order of society. Loyal Church of England 
landowners should possess authority in the communities in which they lived. But 
Morrice introduces an unexpected point of view, which may have been widespread 
among dissenters and former exclusionists. Morrice rejoiced that the ‘old, mercenary 
Tories that have sold the Kingdome, Religion and Civill Interest’ had been dismissed. 
Now the ‘best men’ in all the counties filled the bench, and the king was king of the 
whole nation – ‘nobility, gentry, tradesmen, freeholders, sober Churchmen and sober 
Dissenters’ – rather than king only of a faction. Catholic justices of the peace were 
few except in a small number of counties, and ‘giddy Phanaticks’ were few 
everywhere.51  
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In short, Morrice was expressing satisfaction at the thought that the arrogant 
landowners who had governed the shires since 1660, and who had persecuted honest 
dissenters during, especially, the final years of Charles II’s reign, had at last been 
disciplined. The king was not indiscriminately humiliating a whole social class, the 
landowning gentry who were justices of the peace. He was getting rid of those 
members of that class who had abused their powers. In the process he was creating a 
harmonious, united nation. His regulation of the commissions of the peace was 
therefore to be approved. Morrice’s opinion was remarkably interesting; it was likely 
to have been that of a minority, but a minority which may have been a larger 
proportion of the total population than has hitherto been supposed.  
There is, however, still a good deal to be said for considering the Revolution 
as a manifestation of the discontents of property-owners. It was frequently asserted at 
the time that the purpose of the Revolution had been the defence of ‘liberty and 
property’. One of its immediate consequences was the reinstatement of men of 
property to the offices conferring local authority in the counties and towns from 
which James had dismissed them. The vicissitudes of the ‘rage of party’ during the 
reigns of William and Anne were to produce further changes in the personnel of local 
government, but on nothing like the same scale as in 1687-9.  
An epithet often used to express this interpretation of the Revolution is ‘the 
respectable Revolution’, a phrase used by Lucile Pinkham in the title of a book first 
published in 1954.52 Although Pinkham’s main concern was to demonstrate the long-
standing ambition of William to be king in the British Isles, her word ‘respectable’ 
has come to denote a revolution conducted by responsible persons, pillars of the 
establishment not normally given to revolutionary activity, in combination with 
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William. As property-owners, it was no part of their intention to overthrow 
government or to undermine society. The ‘respectable’ Revolution was, rather, 
intended to sustain government and society, so that the ‘respectable’ classes could 
continue to benefit from the status quo into the future.53
 The principal difficulty in describing the Revolution as ‘respectable’ is that in 
1688-9 some of its more energetic exponents were raffish, disreputable figures. John 
Wildman, Robert Ferguson ‘the Plotter’, and Hugh Speke, for example, had been 
involved in either the Rye House plot or the Monmouth rebellion or both. Forty years 
earlier, Wildman had been one of the Leveller spokesmen in the Putney Debates. 
William was to appoint him Postmaster-General in 1689. The aged regicide Edmund 
Ludlow embarrassed William’s friends by returning from exile in Switzerland, 
proclaiming the virtues of the Revolution.54 Conversely, many of those who were 
either vehemently opposed to the Revolution, or who refused to accept it, were 
eminently ‘respectable’. If Archbishop Sancroft of Canterbury and the other non-
juring bishops were not ‘respectable’, who was? Even so, although the word 
‘respectable’ is not wholly satisfactory, the idea of a revolution which owed at least 
some of its success and permanence to the acquiescence, however lukewarm, of 
property-owners does make sense. 
 Another view identifying the Revolution with a social class, now less 
fashionable than in the 1960s and 1970s, is the concept that 1688 was a ‘bourgeois’ 
Revolution, in the Marxist sense that it was one of the stages in the historical 
development of capitalism as society passed gradually from feudalism through 
commercialism to industrialism. A famous, influential French textbook expressed this 
theory concisely in 1956:  
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Cet essor [of trade] amena un long conflit commercial avec la Hollande et 
avec la France. Satisfaits de la politique de Charles II contre la Hollande, les 
capitalistes anglais furent mécontents de son attitude et encore plus de celle de 
Jacques II à l’égard de la France, devenue la plus redoutable concurrente dans 
le commerce at aux colonies … la lutte économique contre la France, la lutte 
pour la religion la mieux adaptée à l’esprit capitaliste, provoquèrent la 
Révolution de 1688. La Révolution de 1688 est le triomphe de la bourgeoisie 
capitaliste, des marchands de la Cité de Londres, des gentilshommes 
campagnards embourgeoisés par la capitalisme agricole.55
A consideration of the aftermath of the Revolution of 1688-9 lends some substance to 
this interpretation. The Bank of England was founded in 1694, and the Bank of 
Scotland in 1695. The national debt originated in the mid-1690s. By the end of 
Anne’s reign in 1714 it had swelled to approximately £35,000,000, and investment in 
government stock was supplying an annual income to an expanding class of rentiers. 
The growth in the number of joint-stock companies in the 1690s stimulated activity in 
an embryonic stock market operating in the coffeehouses of the City of London.  
 It is, however, difficult to establish a causal link between these ‘capitalist’ 
developments, and the political and constitutional revolution that immediately 
preceded them. ‘Capitalism’ owed as much to the influx of Huguenots from France 
before 1688, as it did to the importation of up-to-date economic practices and 
institutions from the Netherlands after 1689. The bourgeoisie, however defined, 
profited from the Revolution. But the bourgeoisie had already been prospering before 
1688, during the trade expansion of the 1670s and 1680s as the Navigation Acts of the 
1660s began to take belated effect.56  
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 The Revolution of 1688-9 was unusual in that, unlike most revolutions, there 
was no very strong element of financial crisis or economic hardship in the run-up to it. 
The king’s finances were sound even though parliament did not meet after November 
1685. His income was averaging somewhere in the region of £2,000,000 per annum 
by 1688, a fortune by comparison with that of his predecessors. Overseas trade and 
domestic commercial and industrial enterprise do not seem to have slackened much 
during the ten years or so before 1688. It may be that the Revolution was ‘bourgeois’ 
in the sense that, in the long term, bankers, merchants, industrialists, tradesmen, 
shopkeepers, doctors, lawyers and schoolteachers were to become wealthier; and that 
eventually, much later, such persons were to perceive themselves as a consolidated 
and self-aware ‘middle class’. How much the Revolution contributed to this, and how 
much depended on indirect or extraneous factors such as involvement in war between 
1689 and 1763, or participation in expanding transoceanic trade, or a growth in 
literacy levels, is open to question. 
 On the face of it, the assertion that the Revolution was a ‘popular’ rebellion, a 
rebellion welcomed and supported by ordinary people, as well as, or instead of, an 
‘aristocratic’ or ‘property-owning’ Revolution, might seem hard to justify. There were 
few references at the time to the opinions and attitudes of the lower orders. Sir John 
Reresby supplied one such when he remarked in October 1688 that in Yorkshire the 
gentry and ‘the common people’ both accepted that the Prince of Orange was coming 
to England to defend liberty and the protestant religion.57  
 When measuring ‘public opinion’, prosecutions for seditious words in the law 
courts can give some guidance. However, it is hard to tell whether the fact of 
prosecution meant that the words in question were regarded by everybody as 
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scandalous and improper; or whether the prosecution resulted from an attempt by an 
authoritarian élite to suppress widely held views which may have been the tip of an 
iceberg of submerged, dangerous and popular opinions. In the former category, we 
have one Foster Chell of Upton-on-Severn in Worcestershire (to choose a random 
example from many), who, ‘discourseinge of the King of England [in November 
1687] said these words following (vizt) God Damne the King I doe not care a Turd for 
him’. Chell’s defence was that ‘he was so far gone in drink that he did not in the least 
remember what he did or sayd’. In the latter category was, possibly, John Whitaker of 
Winstanley in Lancashire, who was ordered to be set in the pillory and afterwards 
whipped at Michaelmas quarter sessions in Lancashire in 1687. He had proposed a 
health to the duke of Monmouth; ‘being told the Duke of Monmouth was dead, the 
said John [Whitaker] replyed I warrant him he is alive and will bee in England eare 
long and then a fart for the King and all the papists in England.’58 Whitaker’s mention 
of Monmouth reflects a widely-held delusion; but his reference to ‘the papists’ 
indicates a greater degree of awareness than that exhibited by Chell in Worcestershire. 
 Another method of estimating the view of the Revolution taken by ordinary 
people is to consider the activities of the ‘crowd’ at moments when it expressed itself 
through demonstration or riot. Tim Harris has remarked that the processes by which 
‘public opinion’ was formed were more complicated than simply manipulation by the 
élite or propaganda in print, and he has reminded us that it is a mistake to regard the 
crowd, or the ‘mob’, as a single body expressing a collective view. In London there 
were always several ‘mobs’ expressing different opinions at different times. It is clear 
from all the evidence that the acquittal of the seven bishops on 30 June 1688 was 
greeted with mass public rejoicing. But, only six months later, a large crowd gathered 
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to cheer King James on 16 December on his forlorn return from the coast of Kent 
following his first, unsuccessful, attempt to escape. Then, within seven weeks or so, 
the Convention was besieged as it debated the political crisis in late January and 
February 1689 by ‘mobs’ which seem consistently to have urged upon the members 
of both houses (who sometimes had to struggle to get into, and out of, the palace of 
Westminster) that the solution that they wanted was William as king as quickly as 
possible.59 Anthony Rowe, the M.P. for Penryn, asked leave on 2 February to present 
a petition ‘from great numbers of persons’, requesting that William and Mary be 
crowned king and queen.60 By the mid-eighteenth century, some pamphleteers were 
prepared to assert that the Revolution had been conducted by ‘the people’.61
 Even so, the Revolution of 1688-9 as the product of a mass popular uprising 
does not really convince. There were few spontaneous eruptions against James when 
he was still on the throne, except perhaps in Edinburgh in January 1686 and again in 
December 1688. The destruction of a Catholic printing house set up within Holyrood 
Palace was, perhaps, a fairly inconspicuous episode compared to, say, the storming of 
the Bastille in 1789. James’s regime was not overthrown by violent insurrection. 
VI 
An interpretation which is difficult to classify under the headings so far explored is 
that of the ‘whig’ Revolution of 1688, long associated with Macaulay.62 This 
appellation seems unexceptionable. The word ‘whig’ had first been used at the time of 
the exclusion crisis to describe that body of opinion, expressed both in pamphlet 
literature and in political activity by individuals acting in combination, which 
prophesied disaster in the event of the succession of a Catholic monarch, and which 
therefore advocated the ‘exclusion’ of the duke of York from the hereditary line. The 
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original whigs of 1679-81 failed to achieve this objective in spite of strenuous 
parliamentary campaigns, and the duke of York duly became King James VII and II 
in 1685. There followed, as these original whigs had predicted, disaster; the Catholic 
king behaved as they had expected him to do. He introduced both ‘popery’ and 
‘arbitrary government’. In 1689, James was, finally, ‘excluded’ from the throne. 
During the interregnum following James’s first flight, ‘whig’ politicians in London 
and in the provinces displayed tactical skill in outmanoeuvring the divided tories in 
order to achieve this objective.63 The whigs had lost their first ‘campaign’ (exclusion 
in 1679-81), but they had won ‘the war’ (the Revolution of 1688-9). Thereafter, they 
seized the opportunity to embody in the Revolution settlement principles claimed at 
the time, and subsequently, to be distinctively ‘whig’. These included: a limited 
constitutional monarchy; the protection of the liberty of the subject; religious 
toleration; the freedom of the press; an independent judiciary; and a foreign policy 
devoted to placing restrictions on the power of France in conjunction with European 
allies. 
 In the long term, too, the whigs did well out of the Revolution. After 1714, 
they enjoyed a near-monopoly of high office, power and influence. Peerages, 
bishoprics, wealth and privilege came their way. By the mid-eighteenth century they 
had been at the centre of government for so long that the whig ministers of George II 
allegedly ceased to be that monarch’s servants and became his masters. He was a 
‘king in chains’, while the whigs were accused of exploiting his surviving powers and 
prerogatives to their own advantage.64 This ‘whig oligarchy’ had emerged from the 
Revolution; before 1688, the whig ‘party’ had been a ‘country’ party of opposition, 
but William, unlike James, was a king whom the whigs could serve. 
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A close inspection of the ‘whig Revolution’ reveals cracks in the concept. 
James had made overtures to former exclusionist whigs, his natural enemies, a 
minority of whom – the ‘whig collaborators’, such as Lord Brandon in Lancashire, 
Silius Titus in Huntingdonshire and William Sacheverell at Nottingham – had 
responded to his blandishments.65 Moreover, James had alienated the tories, his 
natural allies, by his concessions to dissenters in the Declarations of Indulgence, by 
his reshaping of the personnel of local government, and by his insistence on 
maintaining a large army. Three of the seven subscribers to the letter of invitation to 
William (Danby, Lumley and the bishop of London) were more ‘tory’ than ‘whig’. By 
1688, therefore, it must have seemed that the distinction between whigs and tories had 
been a temporary fashion in politics in the early 1680s, and was now obsolete. The 
ex-whigs (except for the ‘collaborators’) had united with the ex-tories in opposition to 
James’s programme. The Revolution would not have been possible without the co-
operation, however grudging, of some of these ex-tories. 
 Moreover, the implementation of ‘whig’ principles in the Revolution 
settlement was not achieved simply by the exertions of the whigs. For example, 
religious freedom in the limited form of the Toleration Act of 1689 emerged from a 
strategy in which it had originally been envisaged that the ‘comprehension’ of 
moderate dissenters within an elastic-sided Church of England would accompany the 
‘toleration’ of a small remnant of intransigents. But this would have meant that some 
ex-dissenters, now ‘comprehended’, would no longer be subject to the Test Acts and 
would be eligible to hold office. The tories, alarmed at the prospect of puritans in 
power, rejected comprehension and voted for toleration as the lesser of two evils. 
Toleration was therefore achieved with tory collaboration.66 Also, the freedom of the 
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press, more precisely the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1695, was not expected to be 
permanent, and was not unprecedented (the Act had lapsed before, in 1679).67 Whig 
claims to superior virtue in the matter of a free press seem hollow, in the light of the 
circumstance that in 1693 a licenser of the press, Edmund Bohun, had been chastised 
by whigs in the Commons, and hounded from office, because he had not censored a 
tory book.68 Furthermore, the tories had at least as much reason as the whigs to wish 
to limit the royal powers of William, an unknown quantity in 1689 who had not been 
brought up in the Church of England, who was beginning to dismantle the 
episcopalian Church of Scotland, and who was, above all, not ‘their’ king.  
 The whigs may have benefited ultimately from the Revolution, but before 
1714 they did not have everything their own way. William distrusted the whigs. Like 
James, from whom he inherited the idea, he thought that what he called ‘the 
commonwealth party’ was larger than it really was. In the friendly private letters 
James wrote to William in the aftermath of the Monmouth rebellion in 1685, James 
had said, more than once, that ‘the presbyterian and republican party are still very 
busy, and have as much mind to rebel again as ever’. Three years later, William 
repeated to Halifax that ‘the commonwealth party was the strongest in England; hee 
had then that impression given’, adding, ‘hee did not come over to establish a 
commonwealth’.69 William preferred to appoint as his ministers men of experience in 
government with no theoretical commitment to the limitation of monarchical power: 
that is, not the whigs. To everybody’s surprise, Nottingham and Godolphin were 
among his early choices; later, the reappearance of Sunderland as his Lord 
Chamberlain was equally, if not more, astonishing. Throughout his reign it was 
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William’s ideal, only rarely achieved, to appoint a ‘mixed’ ministry with whigs and 
tories cancelling each other out.70  
Queen Anne, in spite of her wish to be ‘queen of all her subjects’, had a 
temperamental preference for Church of England tories in government. She quarrelled 
with her friend of twenty years, Sarah, duchess of Marlborough, whose advocacy of 
whig men and whig measures became too exorbitant for the queen to bear. The trial of 
Dr Henry Sacheverell in 1710 turned into a long and inconclusive argument about the 
rights and wrongs of the Revolution.71 The tories, not the whigs, enjoyed office and 
power from 1710 to 1714. The ‘whig oligarchy’ after 1714 was as much the product 
of the desertion of the Grand Alliance (of which George of Hanover was part) by tory 
ministers at Utrecht in 1713, as of the Revolution. 
 With all these weaknesses, the ‘whig’ Revolution of 1688 is sound enough in 
one sense. The whigs of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, such as 
Charles James Fox (who began to write a History of the Revolution, published as a 
fragment after his death), looked back to the Revolution with reverence as one of the 
episodes from which the ‘liberty’ of their age had emerged.72 The Bill of Rights 
seemed to them to rank alongside Magna Carta. It followed on from the challenge to 
ship money and the abolition of star chamber fifty years earlier.  
The evangelicals of the early nineteenth century, such as Zachary Macaulay 
(the father of the historian) might have recognized one further characterization of the 
Revolution loosely associated with the interpretation that the Revolution was 
distinctively ‘whig’: the ‘moral’ Revolution of 1688. This phrase was incorporated in 
the title of a book by Dudley Bahlman in 1957, and the concept has since been 
amplified and modified by Tony Claydon and Craig Rose.73 The Revolution was 
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followed by a campaign for moral improvement and godliness which reflected one of 
the traditions inherited by the whigs from the puritans of the mid-seventeenth century 
(admittedly some tory clergymen, fearing the loss of moral leadership in their parishes 
and concerned about the revival of populist puritanism, joined in). Societies for the 
Reformation of Manners were formed in London from 1691. The Society for the 
Promotion of Christian Knowledge was founded in 1699. An attempt was made to 
prosecute vices such as drunkenness, swearing and blasphemy in the courts by 
rewarding informers and by financing legal costs. The campaign was linked to the 
Revolution inasmuch as Queen Mary took a strong interest in it. The phrase ‘the 
Puritan Revolution’ has always, rightly, been associated with the revolution of the 
1640s; but it is not inappropriate to apply it, with qualifications, to 1688 as well. 
VII 
A final clutch of characterizations of the Revolution of 1688-9 includes those which 
imply that what happened in 1688 was not a revolution at all, or not a revolution in 
the usual sense. It is certainly possible to argue that, the more we contemplate the 
events of 1688-9, the less easy it becomes to recognize a genuine ‘revolution’. 
 To begin with, there is the theory that the Revolution was a ‘mere coup d’état’. 
A coup d’état may be defined as a sudden upheaval in politics which changes the 
individuals at the head of the government. It is not only sudden; it is also quickly 
complete. There is usually, but not invariably, some element of small-scale violence, 
which lasts only for a short time. If this is all, we could readily accept that the 
definition matches the Revolution of 1688. The Revolution is occasionally described 
as a ‘dynastic’ revolution or as a ‘revolution in the family’, both of which phrases 
convey something of the same sense as ‘coup d’état’.74 There are, however, other 
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nuances. A coup d’état, unlike a revolution, does not normally produce structural 
change in the society over which the reshaped government presides, or a new 
direction for long-term policies. Again, in a coup d’état the mass of persons who are 
governed are little affected by, and perhaps not much interested in, the changes at the 
top. It is indeed true that some persons hardly noticed the Revolution, or regarded it as 
an unwelcome disruption of their own private preoccupations. One Jack Baker wrote 
a two-page letter from London dated 1 December 1688 describing in detail the illness 
of an uncle, which displays complete indifference to the events unfolding around him 
apart from a passing remark that his correspondent’s visit to London would be 
‘tedious’ given the time of the year and ‘this juncture of affairs’.75
 Even from a narrowly legal perspective, the Revolution of 1688 was more 
than a coup d’état; it was, genuinely, a revolution. F.W. Maitland, in lectures written 
in 1887-8, remarked that the English Convention was not a parliament. It had been 
summoned by a Prince of Orange, not by a King of England. Consequently, James 
had not been ‘deposed’, nor William and Mary ‘elected’, by parliament. The 
Convention, not being a parliament when it met, could not turn itself into a 
parliament, since the act which purported to do this was validated by the royal assent 
of William and Mary, who had become King and Queen at the invitation of the 
Convention itself. ‘It seems to me,’ concluded Maitland, ‘that we must treat the 
Revolution as a revolution … we cannot work it into our constitutional law.’76 
Moreover, this fracture in the constitution was accompanied by wider alterations in 
politics and government. The foreign policy of William and his successors was 
radically different from that of James. The relationship between the monarchy and 
parliament, and the relationship between parliament and the monarch’s ministers, 
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were transformed. The royal finances, and the uses to which the money was put, were 
different in the 1690s compared to preceding decades. 
 The coup d’état interpretation of 1688 has something in common with the 
view that it was an ‘aristocratic’ revolution, and it is open to similar objections. More 
people were involved than the royal family and a coterie of senior politicians. The 
cheers greeting the acquittal of the seven bishops, the risings in the north of England, 
the riots in London and Edinburgh, the huge quantity of pamphlet literature devoted to 
the political theory and the philosophy underpinning the Revolution: all weigh against 
the perception of a ‘mere coup d’état’. Jack Baker, mentioned above, was unusual. 
The individual subjects of King James, or most of them, were concerned about forms 
of religion and techniques of government.  
 Next, an interpretation which was powerful in some quarters in 1688-9 and 
which has recently become fashionable again is that the Revolution of 1688 was not a 
‘revolution’ but really a ‘Dutch conquest’. This theory has two great merits. First, it 
sets the Revolution squarely in the context of international politics in the mid-1680s: 
the confrontation between France and Holland, the economic pressures on the Dutch 
republic, the diplomatic crisis over the archbishopric of Cologne, and the impending 
European war which broke out in September 1688 before William’s expedition had 
even left port and which became the Nine Years War.77 Second, it recognizes the 
circumstance that William was conducting a genuine military operation in November 
and December 1688. He expected to be confronted by the English navy and then by 
an Anglo-Scottish army. Why else should he set sail with a fleet of more than 400 
transport vessels accompanied by about 50 men-of-war? Why did the transports 
convey an army of approximately 15,000 men to Torbay?78 William’s Declaration 
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stated that this army was ‘a force sufficient, by the blessing of God, to defend us from 
the violence of those evil counsellors.’79 This was disingenuous. A bodyguard of, say, 
200 soldiers would have been enough to defend William’s person from assassination. 
William did not want to overpower his father-in-law in a full-scale war; but he was 
evidently assuming that he might have to.  
The question of whether James’s navy and army were so permeated by 
officers and men sympathetic to William’s proclaimed intentions that they would 
refuse combat or desert en masse was never put to the test, and is still a matter of 
dispute. Lord Dartmouth, in command of England’s fleet, believed that his ships 
would have fought the Dutch; and he continued to think so after the Revolution. 
Dartmouth’s correspondence indicates that he was over-confident before the Dutch 
fleet set sail on 1 November 1688, and then profoundly distressed at its escape on 3-5 
November.80 He was prevented by a combination of the wrong winds, the wrong tides 
and the sandbanks at the mouth of the Thames estuary from engaging the Dutch ships. 
It is fascinating, if perhaps unhistorical, to conjecture what the result might have been 
if circumstances had been different. The Dutch fleet, with its large number of 
transports, was vulnerable. November was well past the time of year deemed to be 
suitable for naval operations in Northern Europe in the seventeenth century. 
Dartmouth might have been remembered as one of Britain’s great naval heroes if he 
had commanded a fleet which had thwarted a foreign invader in home waters.81
 It is hard to deny that the phrase ‘a Dutch conquest’ applies to Ireland. Some 
thought at the time that it applied to England as well. Henry Pollexfen asserted on 15 
December 1688 that James’s withdrawal had forfeited his rights, and that all William 
needed to do was to declare himself king at the head of his army before issuing out 
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writs for a parliament on Cromwell’s model. ‘Good God bless me! What a man is 
this?’ wrote Clarendon, to whom Pollexfen’s remarks were addressed, in his diary.82 
Others found a parallel with Henry VII’s alleged auto-coronation at Bosworth in 
1485.83  
 The ‘Dutch conquest’ theory is however, open to an objection. Both the 
English and the Scots (though not the Irish) retained in theory the option of rejecting 
William as the replacement for James; and William recognized this himself. Whatever 
his private intentions, which are impenetrable, William’s public pronouncements, up 
to the time of James’s first attempt to escape, were straightforward. William had not 
come to ‘conquer’ the British Isles. His purpose was to join with the leaders of 
responsible opinion in the protection of the protestant religion and the laws, liberties 
and property of James’s subjects against the danger from the evil counsellors who had 
so fatally misled the king. After the flight of the king on the night of 10-11 December 
1688, William’s public attitudes were still clear. It was the duty of a freely elected 
‘parliament’, even if it was not technically a parliament, to decide what to do. That 
‘parliament’ might choose to invite James to return, or to ask William to act as regent 
for James, or to proclaim Mary as queen by herself with William as prince consort, or 
to proclaim somebody else (such as the Prince of Wales, or Princess Anne) as king or 
queen. It was perfectly entitled to do any of these things. But, if it did anything other 
than invite William to accept the crown, then William’s course of action would be to 
go back to the Netherlands with his army and to proceed with the all-important war 
against Louis XIV, leaving the English to face the consequences of the Convention’s 
decision.84  
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William was again disingenuous here. He knew, and everybody else knew, 
that if he retired to Holland with his army, then James would be able to revenge 
himself on his rebellious and now defenceless subjects. Moreover, Mary’s claim to 
the succession would have been permanently extinguished. But William did advance 
this solution as a hypothetical possibility. His credentials as a ‘conqueror’ are 
therefore diminished. Not many ‘conquerors’ announce at the moment of victory that 
they will surrender their conquests if they discover that this is what the conquered 
would prefer. A different principle, but one equally destructive of the perception of a 
‘Dutch conquest’, applies in Scotland. When William was offered the crown of 
Scotland, he was already king of England, and it was not open to him to threaten to 
return to Holland. There were some in the English Convention who thought that the 
Scots might take a different route to a solution compared to England, and that there 
would be little that William could do about it.85 William and Mary were offered the 
Scottish crown without the option of refusing it, and they accepted it in a formal 
ceremony on 11 May 1689 in the banqueting house at Whitehall. General Mackay’s 
subsequent campaigns and the battles of Killiecrankie, Dunkeld and Cromdale 
confirmed an earlier political revolution; they did not win Scotland for William by 
conquest. 
 Another way of looking at the Revolution without admitting that it was a 
revolution is rather different. There was, perhaps, a genuine ‘revolution’ in the British 
Isles in the 1680s, but it did not take place in the winter of 1688-9. It took place 
between 1686 and the late summer of 1688. It was a top-down revolution conducted 
by King James himself, with the willing co-operation of his ministers. Huge 
upheavals took place in the personnel of government, at the centre and in the 
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localities. The royal prerogatives were exploited to transform, not only the judiciary 
and the courts, but also the nature of the relationship between the law and the 
monarch as head of state. The Church of England and the universities were placed 
under the administrative jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical commission. In order to 
implement this royal revolution, the army was increased in size. The king’s revolution 
was resented by his subjects. At the beginning of his reign in 1685, his declaration 
promising to maintain liberty, property and religion had come as a relief to those who 
had anticipated the prospect of a Catholic king with foreboding: Henry Watkinson had 
written from York that  ‘all peoples hearts were transported with joy, thinking 
themselves secure enough upon his Royall Word’.86 By 1688, the conviction that the 
royal word had been broken was everywhere apparent. In other words, James was the 
real ‘revolutionary’; and the Revolution of 1688 was, not a revolution, but a counter-
revolution. It was intended, as far as possible, to restore the English nation to its 
condition at the end of Charles II’s reign. 
 The theory of the Revolution of 1688 as a ‘counter-revolution’ has something 
to recommend it. I have, possibly incautiously, formerly committed myself to it.87 Its 
weakness is that most ‘revolutions’ that were consciously undertaken before 1789 
(that is, excluding such phenomena as the Industrial Revolution) had something of the 
quality of a desire to return to a nostalgically imagined ‘golden age’ in the past. Some 
parliamentarians in the early 1640s thought that Charles I needed to be persuaded to 
govern more in the fashion of Queen Elizabeth I. Some Levellers in 1647-8 wanted to 
turn the clock back to the period before the Norman Conquest. The Restoration of 
1660 was, in part, an attempt to revive what John Aubrey called the ‘long peace and 
luxury’ of the 1630s.88 If James and his counsellors were indeed the ‘real’ 
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revolutionaries of the 1680s, they presumably wished to re-create the Catholicism of 
the pre-Reformation British Isles. Some of the ‘revolutionaries’ of 1688-9, if that is 
what they were, hoped to revive what they idealized as prosperity and tranquillity 
under Charles II. If most revolutions are really counter-revolutions looking back to 
the past, then the idea that 1688-9 was a ‘counter-revolution’ does not advance 
discussion very profitably; it was not unique in this. 
VIII 
No one adjective can encapsulate the complexities of the events of 1688-9 or bear the 
weight of interpretation that is required to define the essential character of those 
events or the consequences which ensued. The possibilities discussed in the preceding 
pages – ‘glorious’, ‘reluctant’, ‘respectable’, ‘sensible’ and the rest – are not mutually 
exclusive, and there is a good deal of overlap. The Revolution was both 
‘conservative’ and ‘revolutionary’; it was both ‘respectable’ and ‘popular’; it was 
both ‘accidental’ and ‘sensible’. It was initiated by a conspiracy, and it has something 
of the character of a coup d’état; at the same time, it marked a permanent change in 
the constitutional, political, governmental and religious norms of the state. The search 
for a single defining adjective is ultimately fruitless, since there are qualifications 
about all of them. We are left, however unwillingly, with ‘glorious’, the adjective 
which has somehow become inextricably associated with the Revolution. We might 
not wish to describe the Revolution by using the word as John Hampden did in 1689, 
or as its celebrants did in 1788, 1888, or even, vestigially, in 1988. But ‘the Glorious 
Revolution’ is the phrase that, for better or worse, has stuck. 
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